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ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN 
RELYING ON AN INCOMPLETE DIAGNOSTIC EVALUATION AT SENTENCING 
The State argues that the trial court did not abuse its 
discretion at sentencing because Dunkel's diagnostic evaluation 
was "substantially complete" (Br. of Appellee at 10-13). 
However, Utah Code Annotated § 76-3-404 (1995), states in 
relevant part, "the Department of Corrections shall conduct a 
complete study and evaluation of the defendant...." (emphasis 
added). Dunkel's evaluation—by the Department of Corrections' 
own admission—was not complete (R. 63, Diagnostic Eval. at 5). 
At the initial sentencing hearing conducted on January 27, 
1995, Dunkel was ordered into the custody of the Department of 
Corrections for a sixty-day diagnostic evaluation (R. 61-62, 
1/27/95 Tr. at 8-9). Approximately fifty days into that sixty 
day period, Dunkel was assigned a new evaluator, Betty Davies, 
because his prior case worker had left the employment of the 
1 
Department of Corrections (R. 63, Diagnostic Eval. at 5). 
Davies, who had a period of less than ten days in which to 
evaluate Dunkel, admitted that "some aspects of this evaluation 
[are] incomplete" (Id.)• 
The State further argues that Dunkel's assertion that he 
received a ten-day evaluation rather than the court-ordered 
sixty-day period is "meaningless because there is no prescription 
that a person committed to the Department of Corrections for a 
diagnostic evaluation for a certain period of time must be 
continuously evaluated over that period" (Br. of Appellee at 11). 
However, the purpose for a sixty or ninety-day diagnostic period 
is to provide the court with "more detailed information" 
concerning a defendant's prior history, his capabilities, and his 
physical, mental and emotional health, prior to the imposition of 
sentence. Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-404(1) (a) (i) and (ii). The 
accumulation of such "detailed information" as set forth by the 
statute requires in depth and continuous evaluation. 
Dunkel asserts that a sixty-day diagnostic evaluation should 
mean sixty-days of evaluation and not simply a period of less 
than ten days—which is the diagnostic period Dunkel received and 
which resulted in an incomplete evaluation. Accordingly, Dunkel 
asks this Court to vacate his sentence and to remand his case to 
the trial court with instructions that a new—and complete, 
diagnostic evaluation be conducted. 
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CONCLUSION AND PRECISE RELIEF SOUGHT 
Based upon the trial court's abuse of discretion, Dunkel 
asks this court to vacate his sentence and commitment and to 
remand the case for new sentencing proceedings with instructions 
that a new diagnostic evaluation be conducted. Alternatively, 
Dunkel asks this court to vacate his sentence and commitment on 
grounds that he was denied the effective assistance of counsel as 
set forth in Appellant's brief. 
DATED this day of May, 1996. 
Margaret P. Lindsay ^— 
Counsel for Dunkel p 
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